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3. Preparations for the Athens European
Council
1.3. 1. The fourth special Council meeting
was held on 20 September with Mr Grigorios
Varfis in the chair.! Preparations had been
made for it, as for previous meetings, by the
ad hoc  working parties and the single
preparatory group.
1.3.2. The single preparatory group held its
second meeting on 12 September, again with
Mr Varfis in the chair. With the special
Council meeting in mind, it discussed the two
aspects of the Commission s proposals drawn
up in preparation for the Athens European
Council which had not yet been dealt with
e. new policies and financing.
The discussions on financing revealed a large
majority, at this stage, in favour of increasing
Community own resources.
With reference to the development of common
policies other than the agricultural policy, the
French, German and British delegations
Bull. EC 9-1983
presented memoranda relating respectively to
the creation of a common industrial and
research area, economic convergence and new
policies. No real discussion took place, but it
is important that new policies should have
been included as a significant element in the
negotiations.
The group also continued its discussion on
changes in the common agricultural policy,
devoting itself largely to procedural matters
and, notably, specifying a number of issues to
be put to the  ad hoc  working party on
agriculture. The group held a relatively short
discussion on the structural Funds 3 primarily
about the ERDF, to pinpoint matters to he
put to the  ad hoc  working party on the
Bull. EC 7/8-1983, point 2.4.
Bull. EC 7/8-1983, points 1.1.2 to 1.1.12.
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structural Funds (technical examination of
matters such as concentration of assistance
quota/non-quota assistance, and the working
of indicative ranges).
1.3.3. In addition to memoranda from
various delegations the special Council
meeting held on 20 September also had hefore
it a communication from the Commission
relating to the development of Community
politices other than the common agricultural
policy .
This communication, devoted to the improve-
ment of the international competitiveness of
European firms, recommends, with an eye to
the Athens European Council, that a number
of priority decisions should be taken with
respect to economic and monetary policy,
strengthening the internal market, energy and
research policy and the development of
advanced technologies.
The decisions in question would be selected
from the numerous Commission proposals
already transmitted to the CounciL They
would be firstly, horizontal decisions on
broad policy and, secondly, more specific
decisions that would bear witness to the
European Council's desire for progress, e.g.
in the economic and monetary spheres and
with regard to new technologies.
3.4. Much of the Council's time was
devoted to hearing each delegation s views on
Community financing. Some Member States
considered the priority to be correction of
budgetary imbalances, with the possibility of
later developments once this problem was
solved, whereas others put the emphasis on
Community dynamism and the launching of
common policies which would in themselves
correct these imbalances.
In conclusion, the chair observed that while
aU the approaches outlined in Stuttgart
should he explored, raising the VAT ceiling
was the only system which the delegations
viewed as capable of ensuring the availability
of new own resources to the Community. He
urged the delegations to look closely into the
feasibility of a hybrid system, combining the
modulation of part of revenue (VAT) with
adfustment mechanism for expenditure
(Danish proposal for a convergence fund).
All the options-including the safety net
proposed by the United Kingdom (an auto-
matic mechanism combining the notions of a
Member State net transfer and its
GDP)-are still open and will be considered
again at the Athens meeting on 10-
October.
With regard to new policies all the
delegations emphasized the very great import-
ance they place on this aspect of the
negotiations. The special Council meeting
discussed at length the procedure to be
followed, with a view to establishing a
parallel relationship between the decisions to
be taken by the European Council in
December on reform of the CAP and
budgetary matters on the one hand, and those
to be taken on other common policies on the
other. The meeting stressed the need to
ensure that the decisions taken in Athens
were not a mere litany of pious hopes but
were feasible measures set within a logical
framework. The meeting asked the Commis-
sion to bring forward a proposal on the
priority decisions to be selected for inclusion
in the Athens package.
To prevent its agenda becoming too crowded
the special Council meeting asked the Council
in its various regular compositions, to
examine certain items. A number of informal
meetings of Ministers took place in September
for this purpose.2
1.3.5. In September the Commission put up
several papers for the special Council meeting.
First, it transmitted its .second communication
on the international competitiveness of Euro-
pean firms, at the request of the September
meeting. This document indicates priorities
on which decisions should be taken before or
during the European Council in Athens:
according the ECU the status of a convertible
currency; European standardization, opening
up access to public contracts, cooperation
between firms; scientific research and the
development of advanced technologies
(framework programme, Esprit programme
1 COM(83)547 final.
Points 2.1.1, 2.1.38, 2.1.75 and 2.1.136.
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telecommunications and biotechnology) and
energy policy.
The Commission also sent two
communications on biotechnology and tele-
communications, 1 supplementing those
transmitted to the Stuttgart European Council
in June.
In agriculture, the Commission presented
proposals for Regulations on the milksector
and on the introduction of a tax on
consumption of oils and fats other than
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butter 3 and its suggestions for changes
in structures policy.4 These proposals are
currently being examined
, .
as regards the
technical problems they pose, by the  ad hoc
working party on agriculture and the single
preparatory group.
Points 2.1.23 and 2.1.25.
Point 2.1.80.
Point 2.1.95.
Points 1.2. 1 to 2. 10.4. Preparations for the Athens European
Counci 
1.4.1. The fifth special Council meeting
was held from 10 to 12 October, attended
by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance
and Agriculture, and with Mr Thorn, 
Ortoli, Mr Davignon and Mr Dalsager rep-
resenting the Commission.! This was the
first real negotiating session: now that the
Member States' positions on the four main
subjects covered by the mandate have all
been presented, the second task of these
special meetings is to work out agreements
on the various points.
Despite urgent . appeals by the chairman
Mr Grigorios Varfis, and the contributions
made byMr Thorn and his colleagues, the
discussions produced little in the way of
progress since the delegations mainly con-
tented themselves with restating established
positions. Expressing his disappointment at
the delegation s refusal to run the risk of
making concessions, Mr Varfis indicated
that the chair would try to put together a
package which would be sufficiently bal-
anced to form a basis for comprehensive
negotiations at the November meeting.
It emerged from the discussions concerning
the reform of the common agricultural pol-
icy that there was no convergence of views
on the milk question. However, there was
some measure of agreement on two basic
issues in connection with cereals-a cau-
tious prices policy and the stabilization of
imports of cereal substitutes. Finally, most
delegations agreed that the MCAs should
be eliminated as soon as possible but two
aspects were still at issue: the German dele-
gation was opposed to ending the MCAs
in two years since it considered that the
resulting price reductions for German prod-
ucers were unacceptable; in future, it recom-
mended that MCAs should be calculated by
reference to the green rate of the strongest
currency. The only real outcome of the dis-
cussions was the creation of a high-level
group to review agricultural questions prior
to a discussion at political level in Nov-
ember.
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No progress was made on the future financ-
ing of the Community. Some Member States
consider that the restoration of balance be-
tween national contributions is a high
priority, while others feel that the Com-
munity must adopt new objectives in re-
sponse to the challenges facing the Euro-
pean economy and hence must provide itself
with the necessary funds. No unanimity
could be reached on any of the solutions
proposed by the delegations, e.g. the safety
net proposed by the United Kingdom or the
convergence fund proposed by Denmark.
The Commission was asked to rework its
evaluation of the budgetary situation up to
1986.
All the delegations confirmed the need for
progress with the common policies. Since
the special Council was not in a position to
adopt the requisite operational measures, it
called upon the regular 'technical' meetings
of the Council to obtain results on the fol-
lowing matters before the next special meet-
ing in November:
(i) Economic and financial affairs: role of
the ECU; EMS and convergence; capital
markets; international economic and mon-
etary cooperation; finance for innovation.
(ii) Internal market: Community certifica~
tion of products from non-member coun-
tries; simplification of formalities at fron-
tiers; standards; temporary tariff protection
for infant industries.
(iii) Research: adoption of Esprit; multi-
annual JRC programme; guidelines for tele-
communications and biotechnology.
(iv) Energy: solid fuels; timetable for the
work programme.
(v) Industry: improvement of the competi-
tiveness of firms and cooperation between
firms.
1.4.2. The single preparatory group met
several times in October to prepare for the
fifth special meeting of the Council and the
Bull. EC 9-1983, points 1.3.1 to 1.3.5.Preparations for the Athens European Council
sixth meeting due in November. At its 28
October meeting it gave a progress report
on three subjects: structural Funds, future
financing of the Community and new poli-
cies. Some progress was made on the struc-
turalFunds, in particular the ERDF, with
the beginnings of a consensus on the Com-
mission s ideas on coordination, a large
measure of agreement on the guidelines for
reforming the ERDF and a favourable re-
ception for multiannual planning. Faced by
the extreme complexity of the various as-
pects of the future financing of the Com-
munity, the inevitable interlocking between
them and the inflexibility of certain posi-
tions, the Commission representatives stres-
sed that only a general political solution
could succeed in Athens. As regards new
policies, following the favourable reception
given on the Commission s proposals for
European cooperation in the industrial sec-
tor, 1 it was decided to set up a new  ad hoc
working party to draft conclusions for the
European Council.
1.4.3. The Commission presented the
special Council meeting with further papers
on the CAP: proposals for amending
the system of monetary compensatory
amounts2 and two proposals for the intro-
duction of a guarantee threshold for durum
wheat and sunflower seed.3 It will give par-
ticular consideration to the Council's re-
quest that it look again at its evaluation of
the budgetary environment up to 1986 and
to the new proposals for the review of the
Regional Fund which will reflect its previ-
ous ideas on defining the role of the structu-
ral Funds.
1 COM(83)578.
Point 2.1.102.
Point 2.1.110.
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methods in question were developed by the
Commission in cooperation with experts
from government and industry.
Agriculture
Proposals for rationalizing
the COmmon agricultural policy
75. After sending a general communica-
tion on this matter to the Council in JUly,
the Commission put up proposals for a
Regulation on milk and milk products 2 the
introduction of a tax .on the consumption of
food oils and fats other than butter, irrespec-
tive of their origin 3 and changes in the policy
on agricultural structures.
Council
1.76. At its meeting on 26-27 September
the Council resumed5 work on the adjustment
of the Community rules on Mediterranean
products, fruit and vegetables and olive oil
but little progress in the alignment of the
various standpoints was achieved. The link
between this work and the current review of
the common agricultural policy was stressed.
As it wound up its discussions, the Council
agreed to take up the matter again at its next
meeting.
77. Other items on the agenda included
the proposal for an amendment of the general
rules for the aid scheme for dried grapes and
dried figs for 1983/84,7 which the Council
again considered, without reaching agree-
ment. It discussed various ways and means of
introducing transitional measures pending the
adoption of a definitive scheme.
The Council also continued its work on
three proposals for Directives recommending
amendments to the Community lists of
less-favoured areas within the meaning of
Directive 75/268/EEC in Italy, the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands 8 and on the
proposal to implement at Community level a
number of coordinated and joint agricultural
research projects between 1 January 1984
and 31 December 1988.9 No agreement on
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the amounts to be allocated to this five-year
programme has yet been reached.
1.78. As decided at its meeting on 16 and
17 May when it discussed farm prices for
1983/84, the Council, subject to Parliament's
opinion endorsed four proposals for
Regulations on structural matters 10 one
concerning the development of agricultural
advisory services in Greece, one amending
Regulation (EEC) No 1054/81 establishing a
common measure for the development of beef
cattle production in Ireland and Northern
Ireland, a third establishing a common
measure to speed up collective irrigation
schemes in Greece, and a fourth setting up a
special emergency measure to assist livestock
production in Italy. These Regulations will
be formally adopted simultaneously once
Parliament has delivered its opinion.
Informal meeting of Agriculture
Ministers
79. On 7 September the Ministers of
Agriculture held an informal meeting in
Athens to discuss new directions in structures
policy, on which the Commission presented
proposals at the end of the month.
Market organizations
Adjustments to basic Regulations
Milk and milk products
80.  On 14 September the Commission
sent the Council the first three detailed
proposals for implementing a system of
production thresholds in the milk sector.
Bull. EC 7/8-1983, points 1.1.2  et seq.
Point 2. 1.80 to 2. 1.84.
Point 2.1.95.
Point 1. et seq.
Bull. EC 6-1983, point 2.1.136.
Point 1.3. et seq.
7 OJ C 94, 8.4.1983; Bull.EC 3-1983, point 2.1.119.
8 OJ C 206, 2.8.1983; OJ C 224, 22. 1983.
9 OJ C 27 1983; Bull. EC 12-1982, point 2. 1.128;
Bull. EC 6-1983, point 2.1.147.
10 Bull. EC 7/8-1983, point 2.1.144.
11 COM(83) 548 final.Agriculture
These proposals link up with earlier ones
made in July on the rationalization of the
common agricultural policy'! They concern
the introduction of an additional levy on
quantities produced in excess of an annual
reference quantity, the introduction of a
special levy on milk from intensive production
units and ~mendments to the basic Regula~
tion to incorporate these new concepts
and to suspend, periodically, buying in of
skimmed~milk powder.
Parallel measures include provisions on the
consumption of butter ~nd processed milk.
At producer level
1.81. The additional levy will amount to
75% of the target price for milk and will 
payable by undertakings or groupings whose
purchases of milk, cream and butter exceed
the reference quantity (101 % of the quantity
bought in 1981); it will be passed on by them
to farmers (and only such farmers) whose
deliveries exceed the quantity delivered during
a reference period corresponding to that used
for fixing the reference quantity for the
purchaser.
This measure should stabilize milk deliveries
without affecting the incomes of small
diary farmers. Failing implementation of this
measure, the effect of the provisions approved
in May 19824 would be to bring down the
price of milk by 12% in 1984/85 in order to
offset the additional expenditure generated by
the excess beyond the guarantee threshold in
1983. If the additional levy system were not
introduced, milk deliveries would exceed the
reference quantity (1981 + 1 %) by 8 million
tonnes.
In terms of farmers' incomes , the proposed
additional levy will be far less damaging than
a drop-albeit by only 2 %-in the common
price for milk in 1984/85.
82. The special levy, put at 4% of the
target price, will be payable by any milk
producer delivering more than 60 000 kg of
milk a year, and producing 15 000 kg of milk
annually per ha of fodder area. This levy
is charged in addition to the existing
co-responsibility levy.
1.83. Lastly, amendment of the basic
Regulation should enable the Commission to
restore sound production in this sector. The
fact that no one will be exempt from the levy
and that intervention buying of skimmed-milk
powder will be suspended for several months
of the year should stem the tide of milk
production fairly rapidly.
At consumer level
84. The four proposals on consumption
of milk and milk products concern the
cessation of aid for direct butter consumption
the extension of aid towards the use of
butter, the introduction of special aid for
concentrated milk and the increase of
butterfat consumption by raising the fat
content of milk.5
Gradual phasing out of the scheme for direct
consumption of butter.  This measure has had
little impact at consumer level (it is estimated
that it yielded an increase in consumption of
20 000 to 30 000 tonnes/year out of 
internal total of 1 692 000 tonne  sly  ear in
1981 and will be phased out in two stages, by
50% on 1 April 1984 and the rest on 1 April
1985.
Use of butter.  The Commission proposes that
the aid scheme for butter used in' the
manufacture of pastry products and ice cream
should be extended to butter used for other
foodstuffs.
Aid for concentrated milk used as animal
feed.  The purpose of this measure is to reduce
the quantities delivered for intervention
by instituting aid for the use of whole
concentrated milk for feeding calves and
skimmed concentrated milk for other live-
stock. Aid for concentrated milk would be
adjusted to take account of the situation on
the butter market; initially it could increase
milk consumption by about 440 000 tonnes.
Supplement 4/83~Bull. EC; Bull. EC 7/8-1983,
points 1.1.6 and 1.1.7.
2 OJ L 148 28. 1968.
Point 2.1.84; see also the reference to oils and fats
other than butter at point...
Bull. EC 5-1982, point 2. 1.76 ; Bull. EC 5-1983,
point 2.1.93.
5 OJ C 289, 25. 10.1983; COM(83) 611 final.
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Oils and fats.  The fourth measure proposed
by the Commission consists in increasing the
fat content of standardized whole milk and
semi-skimmed milk. This should increase
consumption by 20 000 tonnes of butter
equivalent.
Prices and specific measures
Fresh fruit and vegetables
85. The Commission sent the Council
and Parliament the sixth annual report 1 on
the estimated clearings and new plantations
of certain types of fruit trees (apples, pears
peaches and oranges) in the Community,
covering 1980/81. The report shows that
areas contracted by 4500 hectares - a little
under 1 % of the total area of commercial
orchards. Since 1977, areas planted with pear
trees have declined steadily whereas those
planted with apples, peaches and oranges
have remained fairly stable. The largest
acreages for the first three species are in Italy
(50%), France (30%), Germany (8%), the
Netherlands (5.3%) and the United Kingdom
(5.2%).
1.86. On 7 September the Commission
fixed the reference prices for sweet oranges
mandarins, tangerines and clementines for
1983/84 and the Community offer prices
applicable for these products  vis-a.-vis
Greece.2 On the same day it fixed the
minimum purchasing price for oranges
delivered to industry and the amount of the
financial compensation after processing.2
Wine
87. On 9 September the Commission
sent the Council a proposal for a list to be
drawn up of quality sparkling wines produced
in specified regions for which, on account of
their fragile nature and properties, the
duration of the preparation process may be
six months instead of nine months (sparkling
wines produced in southern Italy))
88. On 26 September the Commission
sent the Council two other proposals for
Regulations, one to amend the rules for the
description and presentation of wines and
grape musts, making it compulsory to indicate
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the ingredients used during preparation
and the actual alcoholic strength, and one
concerning special wines, for which it is
proposed that, in the interests of fair
competition, indications likely to mislead
consumers should be prohibited.
89. On 9 September the Commission
laid down detailed rules and instituted the
application of additional measures applicable
to holders of long-term storage contracts for
table wine for the 1982/83 wine-growing
year.5 These additional measures, known as
the 'special price support guarantee , allow
distillation of 100% of the quantity provided
for in the basic Regulation 6 i.e. 18% of the
quantity of table wine produced during the
1982/83 marketing year by .each long-term
stOrage contract holder, and a four-month
extension of storage contracts for the quantity
of wine under contract in excess of this
threshold.
Milk and milk products
90.  On 23 September the Commission
sent the Council a proposal for a Regulation
increasing by 10% the volume of imports
into the Community of Emmental cheese
from Finland,? following the agreement
signed by Finland and the Community on the
development of trade.
91. At its September part-session Parlia-
ment adopted a resolution on the sale of
Christtnas butter at reduced prices.
Beef! veal
1.92. On 26 September the Council fixed
the Community import quota for high-quality
fresh, chilled or frozen beef and veal for 1984
at 29 800 tonnes, in accordance with the
Community s commitment under GA TT.
The CCT duty for the quota is 20%.
1 COM(83)515 final.
2 OJ L 248, 8. 1983.
3 COM(83)467 final.
4 COM(83)529 final.
5 OJ L 250 10. 1983.
6 OJ LS4, 5. 1979.
7 COM(83)549 final.
Point 2.4. 12;  OJ  C 277, 17. 10.1983.
OJ  L 267, 29. 1983.Agriculture
93. Because of high prices and heavy
demand on the markets, the Commission
authorized Greece to extend until 
December the suspension of customs duties
on beef/veal imported from other member
countries'!
Processed fruit and vegetables
94. On 28 September the Economic and
Social Committee adopted an opinion2 on a
series of proposals for measures concerning
products processed from fruit and vegetables)
Oils and fats
95. Among its various proposals for the
rationalization of the CAP, the Commission
adopted on 30 September a proposal for a
Regulation introducing .a tax of 7.5 ECU per
100 kg on vegetable oils and animal fats
other than butter with the exception of those
intended for use other than for food or feed.
This is to supplement the measures to
control production of butterfats through
co-responsibility levies.5 It is designed to
reduce the imbalance between butterfats and
other oils and fats. The scheme should come
into force on 1 January 1984 and apply to all
relevant products, whether produced in the
Community or imported. Revenue from the
tax is estimated at 524 million ECU for one
year, in addition to which there would be a
saving of 56 million ECU on aid to olive oil
consumption. The tax would help to finance
expenditure under the common organization
of the oils and fats market.
The impact of this tax on consumer prices
should be 3-8%, depending on the type or
quality of the oil or margarine in question.
On average it would represent a cost of 0.
ECU per month for a family of four.
The tax would reduce the disparity between
the price of butter and that of other oils and
fats, also reducing the cost of aid for the use
of butter in the food industry (pastry
products, ice cream). It would not affect
competitive relations between imported prod-
ucts and Community products, nor would it
significantly reduce Community consumption
consequently, imports. The proposed
measures constitute a corollary to the meas-
ures proposed for stabilizing the butter
market.
Hops
96. On. 16 September Parliament
expressed a favourable opinion7 on the
proposal for a Regulation fixing the amount
of aid to producers for the 1982 crop.
8 It
urged the Commission to approach exporting
non-member countries to discourage them
from extending their acreages under hops.
Structures
New measures and amendments to Directives
Review of policy on agricultural structures
97. At the end of September the Com-
mission adopted and on 7 October sent to the
Council several proposals for the revision of
the 1972 socio-structural directives (72/159
72/160, 72/161), the 1975 Directive on
mountain and hill farming and farming in
certain less-favoured areas (75/268), and the
1977 Regulation on the improvement of
conditions under which fruit and ve~etables
are processed and marketed (355/77).
98. On 12 September Parliament adop~
ted a resolution7 on the implementation of
the 1975 Directive on mountain and hill
farmin
tf and farming in certain less-
favoured
areas, 1 on the basis of the 1980 Report of
the Court of Auditors.
1 OJ L 264, 27. 198J.
Point 2.4.26.
3 OJ C 94, 8.4.1983; Bull. EC 3-1983, point 2.1..119.
4 OJ C 289, 25.10.1983.
5 OJ L 131 26.5.1977; OJ L 90, 4.4. 1981; OJ L 140,
20.5.1982.
Points 2. 1..80 to 2.1..84.
7 OJ C277, 17.10.1983.
8 OJ C 221 , 18. 1983; Bull. EC 7/8-1983, pOInt
1.135.
Point 1.2.1 et seq.; COM(83)559 final.
10 OJ L 128, 19. 1975.
11 OJ C 358, 31.12.1980.
Bull. EC 9-1983The Athens European Council
1.1.1. Despite intense preparations during
the six months between the Stuttgart .and
Athens European Councils, the 10 Heads of
State or Government, meeting in Athens
om 4 December, broke up two days later
without achieving any progress on any of
the Community s vital problems.
They failed to reconcile their differences
over the reform of the common agricultural
policy, thus stalemating any possibility of
decision on revitalizing the Community and
the accession of Spain and Portugal.
At his final press conference Mr Andreas
Papandreou, who chaired the meeting, an~
nounced that no communique and no state-
ment on political cooperation would be is-
sued, saying:
We felt that in view of the failure, it would
not be worthy of the seriousness of the
moment or of the Commission or the Coun-
cil to make political proclamations. That
would have simply betrayed our naked-
ness..
1.2. After presenting his colleagues with
a final draft compromise on 6 December,
Mr Papandreou had to admit that the meet-
ing was a failure and that nothing positive
had been achieved by the discussions. At
his conference he made the following
comments:
I do not intend to attribute the responsibility to
anyone country. But I must tell you that what
struck me most is that we failed to secure unanim-
ity on any of the subjects which relate to the
Community s economic activity...
And now about the proposals I made. There is a
proposal for a new Messina, for a new beginning.
I do not know whethert anything will come of
it. We agreed, though, that all the issues which
remained open will be resolved by the new Presi-
dency, which takes over on 1 January~the French
Presidency. We wish it luck and hope that it will
succeed where we failed...
Answering journalists' questions, Mr Pa-
pandreou said:
What I know is that if the French Presidency
too, does not manage to find answers to the vital
problems of the continent, then the end of the
Community would be in sight
Bull. EC 12-1983
Mr Fran~ois Mitterrand said that Europe
now knew for sure that it was in a crisis;
they must now make the best of it. During a
press conference the French President noted
that the major crisis which had long been
bubbling under the surface had now boiled
over; he undertook to find remedies during
France s Presidency of the Community in
the first half of 1984.
For this task Mr Mitterrand would be
guided by a few simple principles: Europe
must remain true to itself, Europe needed
to clear away the detritus of the past and
open up new paths. He hoped that a politi~
cal resolve would carry these countries
towards the goal of an all-embracing politi-
cal construction, which would give a tall
historical dimension to the endeavour.
France would not neglect any of its Euro-
pean commitments and was ready to accept
sacrifices and make concessions provided
that the Ten honoured the obligations of
the Treaty of Rome. For Europe to remain
true to her ambition, he reaffirmed the 'ex-
porting role' of European agriculture and
insisted that Europe negotiate an equitable
contract with the United States so as not
to leave the field wide open to American
products.
Chancellor Helmut Kohl declared that de-
spite the serious breakdown at Athens, for
the Federal Republic of Germany there was
no alternative to the Community. He was
disappointed; it was a hard knock for
Europe; the Community had no future if it
could not pay its way. Chancellor Kohl
believed that the next European Council
due to be held in Brussels in March, with
France in the chair
, '
had no alternative but
to succeed': it must be meticulously prepa-
red by many bilateral meetings and con-
tacts, for they could not afford another
fiasco.
The British Prime Minister . Mrs Margaret
Thatcher, told reporters that the Commun-
ity might have to wait until it actually ran
out of money before showing willingness to
reform its finances; some people often got
down to dealing with their problems only
when they neared the brink.Athens European Council
The Italian Prime Minister, Mr Bettino
Craxi, found that hopes for a new stimulus
had been dashed and that certain unbending
attitudes had finally paralysed any agree-
ments which might reasonably have been
secured. He quoted the words with which
he had concluded his speech to the Council:
the Community ought to have left Athens
with a new burst of speed but instead had
been pulled up dangerously short. Let every~
one have time to prepare for a new meeting,
in the konwledge that they would then be
deciding the future of European integration.
The Belgian Prime Minister, Mr Wilfried
Martens, believed that Athens had lacked
political drive and that the procedure of
special Council meetings was inadequate.
He wanted to put things into constructive
perspective so that the setback might pro-
voke awareness and spur Europe into action
again.
The Irish Prime Minister, Mr Garret Fitz~
Gerald, felt that the failure to agree on
the outstanding issues could only harm the
Community. It implied a lack of political
will, which was the most serious shortcom-
ing at Athens.
In contrast, Mr Pierre Werner, the Luxem~
bourg Prime Minister, thought that the
debacle might be good for Europe.
Mr Poul Schliiter, the Danish Prime Minis-
trer, regretted this setback due, as he saw
, to too many technical problems to be
settled by the Ministers.
Lastly, the Dutch Prime Minister, Mr Ruud
Lubbers, stressed that the breakdown was
not due solely to the British problem but
was also attribuable to the southern Euro-
pean countries, which wanted a new North-
South distribution of income in the Com-
munity, and to the financial difficulties of
the Member States.
The only positive feature of this European
Council was that the big countries, thus
divided, had been unable to dominate the
smaller ones.
Mr Gaston Thorn, President of the Com-
mission, said:
'The Community failed to find the consensus dem-
anded by the economic and social crisis and the
tense international situation.
We cannot escape the seriousness of this failure;
but we must not minimize or dramatize it, nor try
to hide it under powder and paint.
I must pay tribute to the Greek Presidency and in
particular Mr Papandreou, who right up to the
last minute was calmly and doggedly trying to save
the day; it is certainly no fault of his or of the
Ptresidency that we failed to do so.
Together with the Presidency we have tried every-
thing during the last few months. But alas, as
President Mitterrand put it, a lot of little things,
valid and important matters, prevented us from
tackling the big issues. Thoughts were on the short
term, on national and sectorial interests, rather
than on the Community.
Today, like yesterday and like tomorrow, solutions
to the problems confronting us can only be Com-
munity solutions; the only answer can be a Euro-
pean one.
I hope that this setback will make the Member
States aware of the need to do something. The
proposals made by the Presidency, in collaboration
with the Commission, remain the focus of discus-
sion and are the only genuinely Community propo-
sals.
Despite all the bitterness left by such a failure
the Commission as a Community institution must
keep things under control, hold the Community
on course and deal with the slightest hint of break-
down. We shall do our duty! At Stuttgart, it was
decided to hold a major negotiation. Today, this
has failed, despite our efforts; but negotiation must
go on.
What matters is to know what Europe we want.
It is not the Europe of moneybags and petty squab-
bles, but a Europe which has regained its missing
cohesion and is again marching forward.
1.3. After hearing a report during the
evening of 6 December by Mr Thorn and
Mr Ortoli on the Athens European Council
the Commission on 7 December discussed
the conclusions to be drawn from the fail-
ure, and indicated the line it would take, in
the following statement:
After Athens, disappointment runs deep. The dif-
ficulties were indeed real ones. They are now even
more serious. But the failure of a European Council
is not the failure of the Community and even less
the failure of a historic process that is to ensure
the strength and prosperity of Europe.
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The Commission will shoulder its responsibilities
to ensure that the Community does not slide back-
wards and undo what it has already achieved, that
essential progress is made without delay and that
the stage is set for the revitalization of the Com-
munity.
If Community achievements are to be preserved,
there must be no more uncertainty to compound
that engendered by the Athens European Council.
The Commission hopes that everything will be
done to make possible a swift decision on the
adoption of the 1984 budget. As the European
Council failed to adopt the proposed economy
measures, the Commission will take the decisions
that are within its powers and put to the Council
the necessary proposals for implementing the 1984
budget.
The decisions which will enable the Community
to honour its pledges-to itself, its citizens and
other countries-must be taken in good time.
It would not be right for the Community to wait
until it had settled all its problems before embark-
ing on the urgent action needed for its future
development. Steps must therefore be taken imme-
diately to restore confidence and underpin econ-
omic recovery; early decisions must be reached on
the Commission proposals for projects of Com-
munity interest, where any delay would jeopardize
success.
The Community s obligations to certain social cat-
egories, certain industries and certain regions are
unchanged.
To uphold the Community s interests the Commis-
sion will continue to discharge its responsibilities
to the full in negotiations with non-member coun-
tries.
The Commission will act to ensure that the Com.
munity emerges revitalized from the crisis. What
this means in the main is well known: the European
dimension must be fully exploited; the Community
must be afforded the resources essential to ensure
its development; a lasting solution must be found
for the budget problems; the common agricultural
policy must be allowed to perform its role more
effectively; available resources must be efficiently
managed; the accession of Spain and Portugal must
be made possible.
This means an end to the clash of conflicting
national interests on too many single isolated is-
sues and a return to the procedures of the Treaty,
the only ones which can make the superior interest
of the Community central to the debate. This will
prepare the way for agreement.
Europe belongs to its citizens. And its citizens
demand of their institutions that they enable the
Community to achieve economic recovery and
pave the way for a better future
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1.1.4. During Parliament December
part-session, before the debate on the
Athens European Council and the report on
the Greek Presidency, Mr Papandreou made
the following speech:
The fact that this European Council failed was
the result, not of recent and random events, but
of a process of deterioration which has been going
on for years, one of internal erosion and deadlock.
European Councils have been taking place one
after the other, each one making well-intentioned
attempts to conceal the crisis with statements of
good intent. The failure to face up to the crisis,
however, merely helped to compound matters.
Over the past few years, scarcely anything has been
achieved on a common approach to the economic
crisis and to the massive unemployment which has
afflicted, and is still afflicting, Europe. Combined
efforts to bridge the technology gap between
Europe and its main economic competitors have
been negligible. Nothing of substance has been
achieved in the social sector. Virtually nothing had
been done to provide the Community with the
cohesion it needs, especially after its successive
enlargements or for the next enlargement to which
we look forward. On the contrary, as you have
yourselves pointed out, inequalities have increased
rather than diminished within a Community which
grows ever less homogeneous.
What is to blame for this inertia? I believe that
in recent years Member States' reactions to any
proposals have been conditioned principally by
their estimates of the effects which its acceptance
or rejection will have upon their contributions to
or their receipts from the Community budget. It
would be an exaggeration, or at least a harsh
judgment, were I to say that each party has tried
to shift his problems on to his neighour. But in
the mean time scope for postponement has been
shrinking all the time. This is partly because run-
away expenditure, much of which was and 
genuinely wasteful, combined with the effects of
the crisis have led to the exhaustion of the Commu-
nity s own resources, and partly because, with the
European elections a few months hence, all of us
are obliged, or at leastr ought to be obliged, to say
what kind of Europe we wish to see.
This was the situation when we arrived in
Stuttgart.
In line with the Stuttgart mandate, the Greek Presi-
dency has worked towards the dual objective of
growth and savings. But I am bound to say that
both during preparations for the Athens meeting
and at the meeting itself, I had a strong impression
that savings and not growth was the primary ob-
jective; that it was an end in itself, and not the
expression of a need for rational use of resources.Athens European Council
I think I can justly say that.a considerable disparity
became apparent between the objectives which
were set and the willingness to make available the
increased means necessary for attaining them.
In particular, in the matter of an increase in own
resources, there was a strong tendency to favour
a very small increase which would cover no more
than the needs arising from enlargement, which
were in any case viewed restrictively. This was an
approach which did not lead to any substantial
development, which did not correspond to :lny of
the major challenges of out time. How can we
accept that it is beyond our financial means for the
Community budget in 1990 to represent something
more than 1 % of the Community s GDP and
something less than 3 % of all the national budgets
of the Member States taken together? Or that
expenditure on new policies must not exceed the
administrative expenditure of the budget? For
those were the goals set for 1990, according to the
proposals for the increase in own resources.
The rigorous review of budget matters, to which
I referred earlier, links the creation of a dynamic
Europe with the internal budget policy of each
Member State. This line of thinking makes obvious
the reservations which exist in certain Member
States as to the possibilities and effectiveness of
Community policies.
There seem to be serious doubts whether a Com-
munity policy can produce greater or better results
than the sum total of national policies. This as-
sessment, at least in some sectors, is mistaken
since, for instance, total expenditure on research
in the Community Member States is higher than
in Japan or the United States, but to much less
effect.
Behind the conflict of interests over the fixing of
expenditure on milk or in other sectors there lies,
I believe, a fundamentally different perception on
the part of each of us regarding the Europe of
tomorrow. This clash of views took on tangible
form with the two different positions which were
discussed with regard to budgetary discipline. One
school of thought maintained that it was first
necessary to determine the available resources each
year before deciding on expenditure. The other
gave pride of place to laying down the common
policies which will ensure the cohesion of Europe
(regional policy, structural policy) and the policies
which will form the Community s industrial strat-
egy. In an attempt at compromise, the Presidency
suggested increasing own resources, and put for-
ward proposals which would make it possible to
take a fir.st step, or at least a step in the right
direction, towards the develoment of Europe.
I consider it self-evident that expenditure must be
properly directed, but it must also be controlled
and thus permit a fair allocation, an allocation
which take into account the need for a transfer of
resources from the richer to the poorer countries.
I believe, above all, with regard to the procedure
for drawing up and voting on the budget, that
there should in no way, either directly of indirectly,
be any restriction on the powers of the European
Parliament.
I should like to point out in this connection that,
quite apart from whether the various discussions
are concentrated on special topics and often take
on a technical character, the positions of the Mem-
ber States conceal their basic political choices
regarding the kind of Europe which they would
like to see. The arguments used reflect a first basic
choice which determines the way in which each
Member State looks at Europe.
The choice quite simply is this: either we are
talking about a customs union, backed by a com-
mon agricultural policy and the appearance of a
regional or social policy, or we are talking about
a body of States with a multiplicity of needs which
can only be met in the framework of common
policies.
The question where the Community s resources
will .come from and how much they will be is a
political .choice linked to the question of the com-
mon needs which Community expenditure must
meet.
It is clear that these needs alter with the interna-
tional economic situation, the homogeneity or lack
of homogeneity of the group formed by the Mem-
ber States, the pressure to hasten structural ad"
justments in the sector of investment and new
technology.
There are, however, also other choices behind the
disagreements over this or that particular problem.
There is the choice of a Europe which will have
its own stronger identity in the face of the rest of
the world, a more coherent external commercial
policy, endowed with means commensurate with
those which other major world commercial powers
have and' use.
The problem is of course wider. It goes beyond
commercial policy and is directly linked to Eur-
ope s role on the world economic and monetary
stage.
A third decision we were faced with at Athens
concerned the so-called British problem. We all
accepted that a feature of Community solidarity
consists in not placing an exceptionally large bur-
den on a country which, while its per capita income
is lower than the Community average, derives a
relatively small amount from expenditure under
the budget because for historical reasons its agri"
cultural production is relatively low.
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The development of new policies together with
the rationalization of the agricultural policy will
normally speaking constitute the long. term solu-
tions to the problem. In the meantime, however
it will be necessary in the next few years to find a
just solution but .one which does not undermine
certain basic principles. We therefore ruled out the
concept of net balances which not only give a very
incomplete picture of the position of a country
in the Community system but also tend in the
direction of the so-called fair return (giving as
much as is taken), a concept which is also unac-
ceptable in an economic union.
Another option which I mention last, not because
I feel it to be less important, but on the contrary
because it is also a dimension of all the other
options to which I have referred, concerns the
relations between the less-developed and more-
developed countries of the Community. This,
without of course ignoring Ireland' s geographical
sitUation, we refer to as the North-South problem.
Today I wish to restrict myself to aspects which
were discussed in the Athens talks.
In agriculture there is unequal treatment as be-
tween products from the north and those from the
Mediterranean. Northern products have greater
protection  vis-a-vis  non-menber countries and high
rates of support which together have resulted in
certain cases in the creation of enormOUS surpluses.
The rationalization of the agricultural policy de-
mands measures for a retUrn to a normal situation
and, in addition, measures for preventing the crea-
tion of such surpluses for other products. Is it
however, fair and reasonable, on the pretext of the
need to achieve savings, to demand a reduction in .
EAGGF intervention where there is no danger of
surpluses? And this because a certain amount of
assistance is given to compensate to some degree
for the lack of adequate support and for the conces-
sions granted to non-member countries within the
framework of the Community s commercial pol-
icy?
To put this more plainly, when we start out with a
sitUation where there is unequal treatment between
northern and Mediterranean products the need to
reduce agricultUral expenditure cannot be distri-
buted equally between northern and southern
products.
To permit the development of a true and coherent
structural policy and to achieve convergence of
economlies and the progressive elimination of ine-
qualities there must be a substantial increase in
the resources of the structural Funds. Within that
framework it is proposed that there be additional
financing for the integrated Mediterranean pro-
grammes, which are absolutely necessary to coun-
ter both the structural problems caused by the
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under-development of the Mediterranean regions
and the negative effects of the enlargement of the
Community to include the Iberian countries (Spain
and Portugal), which we all fervently desire.
Finally, as regards the Community s industrial
strategy, it is reasonable that it should be so struc-
tured as to benefit all the regions of the Com-
munity.
Measures will have to be taken to ensure that the
less-developed regions make a real contribution to
research and the transfer of technologies. At the
same time those regions need support for certain
branches of industry which are not in such a strong
position as others.
It is inconceivable that there should be a Commun-
ity in which the less-developed countries are re-
garded principally as markets for the industrial
products of the more developed Member States.
I feel that it is now time, in order not to create
false impressions as to what benefits or damage
each country derives from participation in the
Community, to see the extent of the effects on
the balance of payments. This is because there is
always a tendency to restrict ourselves to revenue
and expenditure under the budget. For us in Greece
the worsening of the balance of trade in the two
years since full accession far outweighs any bene-
fits we derive from the Community budget.
As regard the Greek Presidency, I believe that we
fulfilled our obligations as far as possible.
If we failed to agree I do not believe this was due
to a lack of technical preparation. It was due to a
lack of political will and a lack of imagination.
On this point I should like to .emphasize that
at the Athens European Council meeting, as at
previous European Councils, points arose which
should have been solved and must be solved at
Council or Permanent Representative level. One
of the unfortunate aspects of European Councils
is the tendency not to solve any problem at a lower
level and to heap everything onto the Summit. For
future Presidencies, I feel a precondition for the
success of a Summit is for the agenda to be kept
to matters of substance-that is, to the major
political options and decisions, those which can be
understood by the peoples of Europe.
Once the failure had become evident, we did not
at any moment attempt to cover it up  vis-a-vis 
public opinion which is not much interested any
more in the Community, either bequse it does not
understand or does not believe what we tell it. The
crisis of confidence which affects the attitude of
our peoples towards Europe is today a matter just
as grave as the crisis affecting the functionning
of the Community. To mislead European public
opinion or cover up the failure would have been
the worst option. For that reason the PresidencyAthens European Council
showed the impassein its true colours and assumed
the responsibility of not having discussion of the
other matters which the meeting was to deal with.
I should like to state that we were, naturally,
anxious that the Athens meeting be crowned with
success.
Obviously its utter failure, particularly as regards
the question of own resources, which is linked
to the furthering of the integrated Mediterranean
programmes, and on the question of reforming the
structural Funds of the Community, does not at
all help our attempts to solve the Community
problems. And plainly with the dose of the Greek
Presidency the problems will again come to the
fore. However we do see something positive emer-
ging from this turn of events. 
The blatant failure of the meeting bears out as it
were some of our doubts as to whether we have
the political will to undertake a substantial reor-
ganization of the Community so that its function-
ing is acceptable to all the Member States. We have
repeatedly stressed the absolute need for certain
changes, because of the lack of any adjustment of
the Community s institutions in the last 25 years,
despite immense changes in the situation within
the Community and outside it.
In this framework must be seen the suggestion we
made that perhaps the time had come for a new
Messina, where we would, without abandoning
the spirit of the Treaty of Rome, reclarify our ideas
about the important problems of our time.
It is clear that only in an atmosphere of crisis and
complete failure can the impetus be created for a
radical re-examination of the progress and future
of Europe.
The crisis we are facing today may therefore con-
tain the seeds of a readjustment of the Community
in the right direction.
For many years the Community has had the bad
habit, resulting from the defects 1 have referred to,
of solving crucial problems not at five to midnight
but at five past midnight. Somewhere between
the two we have passed the torch to the French
Presidency. We all join in wishing it, as it continues
the efforts made in the last six months, success in
this hour of truth in giving the Community an
effective new impetus.
Taking the floor after Mr Papandreou, Mr
Thorn enlarged upon the Commission
statement of 7 December:
I should like to begin-not out of courtesy or as
pure formality, but out of a sincere desire to be
objective-:-by paying tribute to Mr Papandreou
for the competence, and above all the impartiality
and authority, with which he conducted the pro-
ceedings at the Athens European Council.
I was a witness of his diligence and genuine Euro-
pean commitment, and I must say before this
House that the President of the Council deserved
to see his efforts crowned with success.
Unhappily, we achieved nothing like that .result
since the European Council was a blatant faIlure...
This is all the more alarming in that the problems
over which the Community came to grief in Athens
have been under discussion within the Community
for many years now.
Europe' now knows for sure it has a crisis , said
President Mitterrand.
Nevertheless, the shock could be good for Europe
if we learn the lessons in time...
I should therefore like first to analyse the possible
causes and them draw somecondusions.
In considering what happened we must get down
to basics and so shun any speculation on how far
any particular Member State or individual was to
blame. The fact of the matter is that the failure at
Athens was a collective failure, for which nearly
all the members of the European Council bear
some responsibility, even though, as always, some
were more flexible and others less so.
In the Commission s view an initial cause lay in
the preparation procedure agreed on in Stuttgart,
in that this special peocedure not only hardened a
tendency for the role devolving upon the European
Council to swell out of all proportion... without
real negotiation ever actually beginning: it also
resulted in Member States tabling more and more
roposals as alternatives to those of the Commis-
SiOn.
For some years now the regular Councils have
tended to abdicate from their function, which is to
take decisions, and become a kitchen for European
Councils, or simply a talking shop...
This warping of Community procedures was
pushed to its extreme in the "special procedure
decided at Stuttgart in order to conduct a "major
negotiation" which was to produce an agreement
on a final package at the Athens European Council.
The choice of this procedure unfortunately invol-
ved the risk of linking all the outstanding problems
together, leaving the specialized Councils stripped
of their competences, swelling the European Coun-
cil agenda and confusing things technical with
things political and routine management with deci-
sions committing the future.
At Stuttgart the Commission had already warned
against the risk that such a procedure might bring
everything grinding to a halt. We at least managed
to convince those who were tempted to hold this
negotiation in an intergovernmental setting
without any reference to the Treaty and Commun-
Bull. EC 12-1983Athens European Council
ity procedures. The Commission then did all 
could to stop special Council meetings substituting
for the normal decision-making authorities in a
whole series of areas (internal market, research,
industry, energy, and so on) where in fact consider-
able headway was made, but which are precari-
ously balanced because of the connections estab-
lished between the various dossiers at Stuttgart.
The rule whereby the Council may act  only  on the
Commission s proposals and cannot amend them
unless it is unanimous was not respected in the
discussion on correcting budgetary imbalances and
on financial discipline. Consequently, the Euro-
pean Council had before it five or six alternatives
to the Commission proposals...
No wonder that with no central bearings, the
Council got completely bogged down in the morass
of rival formulas. No wonder either that the
national proposals were all biased towards the
specific interests of the countries that had put them
forward.
No wonder that the failure was the result of so
blatant a violation of Community procedures. The
authors of the Treaty, having benefited from long
experience of what intergovernmental cooperation
was like, had clearly seen the need to reserve the
right of initiative to the Commission, as the only
way of marshalling Council proceedings around a
single proposal inspired-as far as possible-by
the general interest of the Community. The Mem-
ber States may criticize, reject or suggest amend-
ments to the Commission proposals, but they can-
not substitute their own. The same criticism ap-
plies to the tendency to amplify and unduly
enhance the function of the Council Presidency.
I must alert you to the risk that this harbours for
the Community s institutional balance, and I am
doing so just as the Presidency is ahout to change
hands, in order to make it clear that is a question
of principle and not of individuals.
True, there may well be some positive points. But
the drawbacks would far outweigh the advantages
if the Member State taking its turn in the Council
chair gradually came to behave-however noble
its intentions-as if it were taking charge of the
destiny of the Community. Europe does not have
a change of government every six months; decision
deadlines are not confined to June and December.
The success or the failure of a Presidency must not
be .judged by the results of the European Council.
No one has anything to gain by that. The Presi-
dency has its own tasks: it organizes the work of
the Council on the basis of Commission proposals;
it regulates the pace of the work and coordinates
between the various Councils; it wields its influ-
ence at the end of debat~s to coax delagations into
any necessary compromIses...
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So I wonder whether the main cause of the Athens
debacle is not the lack of genuine agreement on
the scope and meaning of European integration....
What sort of Community do we want? What are
our plans? How is it that the questions on which
the European Council foundered in Athens are the
same ones that caused the deadlock at Lancaster
House in 1981? ...
No Member State has so far proposed that the
Treaty be amended through the procedures of
Article 236. And yet there can be no denying that
on certain issues the Member States ha.ve adopted
national positions that openly flout the rules of
the Treaty, in seeking, for instance, to institutiona-
lize the principle of fair return or to limit Parlia-
ment s budgetary powers.
It is time that we said whether we are challenging
the Treaties and their basic principles or whether,
instead, we are going to find ways consistent with
the Treaty for reforming the Community and pro-
ducing.a blueprint for revitalization.
If the abscess must be burst, let us do it now,
otherwise the European Council can only perpetu-
ate the failure.
The most important lesson that the Commission
has learnt from the deadlock is that we must return
to the Community s normal rules and procedures
in order to tackle the present difficulties and sur-
mount them.
It is in such a return to the very principles of the
Community that we shall find that second wind
to enable us to clear the hurdle which brought the
Community down in Athens.
The Commission will accordingly ask the special-
ized Councils before the year is out to resume their
work in their respective fields on the basis of the
proposals which have been before them for so
long.
The Commission is determined to keep its propos-
als on the Council's desk. It will not consent to
amend them until it thinks that doing so may help
secure agreements compatible with Community
interests.
That is the position I took in preparing for Athens
and at the European Council. I will stick to it.
On several issues where decisions are urgently
required, the regular Councils must act swiftly
without waiting for the next European Council.
This applies to agriculture ...
The decision that the European Council will even-
tually take on increasing own resources is not a
consolation prize for the sacrifices that will be
involved in the reform of the CAP. Agricultural
spending must be curbed in any event.Athens European Council
The CAP, we all know, must inevitably become
unmanageable if we maintain the principle of un-
limited guarantee.
It is not for the European Council to settle the
technicalities of essential adjustment, to allocate
milk quotas, ... decide whether to retain or stop a
premium here or direct aid there.
That is the business of the Council. Proposals are
on its desk which would keep agricultUral spending
within the limits of the budget: it is therefore duty
bound to act with no further delay, and at all
events before the next marketing year begins.
Likewise, the Council must, in its appropriate com-
position, complete its work on reforming the
ERDF, press on with implementing the Copen-
hagen programme for developing the internal mar-
ket, define a strategy for joint action on the new
technologies... there s no lack of examples.
I will take just one more, since it is symbolic. A
decision on the financing of the Esprit programme
must be taken right away. The research experts
have agreed on the content and scope of the pro-
gramme. Industry is poised to play its part and
willing to bear its share of the cost.
The Commission will make the necessary choices
to keep annual expenditure within the limits impo~
sed on the budget by the ceiling of own resources.
In the circumstances ... it would be improper for
any Member State to withhold its agreement, pen-
ding conclusion of a general package, in order to
keep in hand an asset of 700 million ECU. No one
may hold Europe s industrial future to ransom just
to gain a little extra bargaining power.
If, with the help and support of Parliament, the
Commission manages to make its voice heard, if
the machinery of Community decision-making can
be set in motion again, instead of being jammed
by special procedures putting disparate issues to-
gether in packages, the European Council can re-
discover its highly strategic and political role of
directing and prompting the work of the Council
and taking decisions on the major political options
that shape the future of the Community.
The decisions on the Community s future financial
system clearly belong to that category. The Euro-
pean Council, alone, can and must take the deci-
sions of principle on which any increase in Com-
munity own resources depends.
Only three issues are involved: the sharing of the
budgetary burden between the States, the financial
directives to guide the Council in exercising its
responsibilities as one of the arms of the budgetary
authority and the volume of resources to be put
at the Community s disposal to make enlargement
possible and provide a lasting assurance that it can
continue its development.
These are indeed three basic issues which go to the
very roots of the Community and will determine its
future.
We must build an equitable and permanent finan-
cial system, which will eliminate the annual hag-
gling over arbitrary budget rebates. The compro-
mises and sacrifices that will have to be made 
secure budgetary peace within the Community will
not be accepted by all unless they are part of an
ambitious programme for the future.
To have no ambition for Europe and to stint on
the means for its development is undoubtedly the
surest way for the European Council to fail, even
in reshaping what has been achieved.
When reduced to its essentials in this way, the
European Council's task is clearly still bristling
with difficulty. But even though Athens was a
failure for the reasons I have just discussed, I am
looking forward confidently to the next meeting.
I am still firmly convinced that a historic endeav-
our like the building of Europe will not be halted
by a budgetary wrangle as confined as this one.
For all of us here know how much is involved.
The Community budget is less than 1 % of Euro-
s total GDP. The budget imbalances to be cor-
rected represent no more than a tiny fraction of
the GDP of the countries concerned.
Having said that, I am not implying that this
imbalance can be ignored or that the Community
budget can be managed loosely and without disci-
pline; our proposals show that the exact opposite
is true.
But I owe it to the public and to Parliament to put
things into proper perspective. I must remind the
governments which seek to outdo each other 
restrictions when talking about funds for Europe
that you cannot handle a Community budget rep-
resenting 1 % of our total GDPs like national budg-
ets, which redistribute an average of 40% of the
national wealth of the Member State.
A second reason which justifies my faith in the
future is the attachment to European integration
that I detect whenever I am talking with the Heads
of State or Government. Deep down, they all know
and recognize that there is no alternative to the
Community, that the future must lie in reactivating
the integration process ...
I cannot believe that they will go on allowing
themselves to be swayed by. counting-house re-
flexes, at the risk of imperilling European unifica-
tion and 25 years of noteworthy achievement, let
alone the promise of the future.
I sincerely believe that we shall climb out of our
present predicament if all together we learn the
lessons of the failure in Athens and go back to
Bull. EC 12-1983Athens European Counci.
the principles and methods which produced the
Community s early successes.
President Dankert has said that the failure of the
European Council may be a healthy shock for the
system. I, too, would like to believe that.
You know the conclusions that the Commission
on its side, has set out. To remind the puhlic that
the breakdown of a European Council is not the
breakdown of a historic unification process, it
declared on 7 December that it would "shoulder
its responsibilities to ensure that the Community
does not slide backwards and undo what it has
already achieved, that essential progress is made
without delay and that the stage is set for the
revitalization of the Community
The Commission expects that Parliament's action
will be inspired by the same concern. The Com-
munity must now be governed despite-and per-
haps because of-the deficiency of the European
Council. It must therefore give itself the budgetary
means to do this in 1984.
It is vital that at this difficult juncture the Commis.
sion and Parliament... support each other and
together demonstrate that they are capable of lead-
ing the Community along the path traced by the
Treaties in the interests of Europe.'
Mr Piet Dankert, the President of Parlia-
ment,  had announced in a communique on
6 December that he hoped the House would
relaunch Europe, for the total failure regis-
tered in Athens would have dangerous re-
percussions on the functioning of the Com-
munity. He urged Parliament promptly to
draw the necessary conclusions from the
Athens fiasco and make the revival of the
Community the main theme of the six
months up to the European elections in
June.
During the debate members commented at
length on the failure, trying to account for
it in various ways. Mr Ernest Glinne, Chair-
man of the Socialist Group, found a simple
formula to describe it: 'absolute zero , and
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called the Council shortsighted and faint-
hearted; it had behaved like some exalted
cashier, unable to distinguish between what
w~s essential and what was just secondary.
Mr Paolo Barbi, Chairman of the EPP
Group, was dumbfounded that the 10
Heads of State and Government had taken
no position on -the conflicts threatening
peace. For the European Democrats, Lady
Elles thought that a failure was better than
an unacceptable compromise; bad solutions
created more problems than they solved.
The spokesman for the Communists, Mr
Guido Fanti, declared that Athens had tol-
led the knell of old Europe. The States had
shown they were unable to react to events.
For the Liberal and Democratic Group, Mr
Martin Bangemann had two explanations
for the Athens fiasco: the Heads of Gov-
ernment had the political will but lacked
the capacity to take decisions; though each
State was individually living in democracy,
Europe was not, since it could not take a
majority decision. At the end of the debate
Parliament passed a resolution moved by
Mr Ernest Glinne (Socialist Group), Mr
Pierre pflimlin (EPP Group), Mr Adam Fer-
gusson (ED Group), MrMartin Bangemann
(Liberal Group) and Mr Guido Fanti (Com-
munist Group) on the failure of the Athens
European Council. Deploring the power-
lessness of the European Council, Parlia-
ment called for a considerable strengthening
of the Community institutions, particularly
Parliament. It considered that the Council
could help to reverse the situation created
by the failure to take decisions in Athens
by responding positively to the proposals
advanced by Parliament for facilitating the
restructuring of the budget and establishing
conditions and prospects for a genuine
European recovery.European Community .A..
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THE FAILURE OF THE ATHENS SUMMIT DOES
NOT MEAN THE FA I LURE OF THE COMMUN I TV
The Commission of the European Communities says it wi 11 work to " relaunch"
the European Community following the failure this week of a summit meeting in
Athens to resolve the Community s financial .crisis.
The three-day European Counci 1 meeting, attended by the heads of government of
the 10 Cornmun i ty member states and the pres i dent of the Commi ss ion, broke up
December 6wi thout producing an agreement on proposed reforms to the Common
Agr i cuI tura 1 Pol icy (CAP) and to EC fi nanci ng mechan isms.
Whi le "disappointment is deep, " the Commission said in a statement issued
December 7, the failure of a surnmit meeting does not mean the failure of the
Community, let alone of a "historical process that is to ensure the prosperity
and strength of Europe.
However, the Communi ty must take irnmedi ate steps to " restore confi dence and
underpin economic recovery, " the Commission said, and it must return to procedures
that put the IIh i gher interest of the Communi ty, II rather than confl i ct i ng national
interests, at the center of the debate.
Among the prerequisites for reactivating the Cornmunity, it added, are adequate
financial resources, a lasting solution to budget problems, increased efficiency
of the CAP , and en 1 a rgement of the Commun i ty to i ncl ude Spa in and portuga 1 .
Gaston Thorn, president of the Commission, said in a press conference December
6 tha t he hopes the A thens fa i 1 u re will ma ke membe r s ta tes recogn i ze the steps
they must take to find a "European solutionll to the Community s problems.
Pieter Dankert , president of the European Parliament, said in a December 6
statement that the summit' s failure demonstrates the !'paralysis" of the
:omm~n i t~ and the i nab i 1 i ty of the Eu ropean Counc i 1 to wo rk as a Commun i  Institution. He called for Europe to reflect on its IIreasons for being
~nde~ th,; Jeade~s~i ~ of the Parl iament, which he described as the only Community
Instl tutlon legl tlmlzed by universal suffrage.
The text of the Commission s statement is as follows:
Following Athens, disappointment is deep. The difficulties were real
and the have been made worse. However the failure of a Euro ean Council 
. . . .
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session is not the failure of the Community, let alone the failure of a
historical process that is to ensure the prosperity and strength of Europe.
liThe Commi ss i on wi II face its obi i gat ions to ensure that the Commun i ty ' s
achievements are preserved and progress continues without delay, and to create
the cond it ions for a re launch i ng of the Commun i ty.
Preserving the Community s achievements require that there be no further
uncertainties beyond those arising from the Athens European Council session.
The Commission is anxious that conditions be established for speedy adoption
of the 1984 budget. As the Eu ropean Counc i I did not dec i de on econom i c
measures proposed by the Commission, the Commission w.i11 take its responsibi1ities
and submit to the Council the proposals that are necessary to implement the 1984
budget.
I t is i mperat i ve that the dec is ions be made on schedul e so that the
Community can honor its pledges to itself , its citizens and non-member countries.
lt would not be right for the Community to wait unti1 it had settled a11
of its problems before embarking on the urgent action necessary to its future
development. Accordingly, steps must be taken immediately to resto.re confidence
and underpin economic recovery. Quick decisions must be reached on the projects
of Community interest submitted by the Commission in order not to jeopardize their
success.
The Community s obi igation to certain social groups, certain sectors and
certain regions sti 11 stands.
To uphold the Community s interests, the Commission will continue to fully
meet its responsibilities in negotiations with non-member countries.
The Commission will take every action in order to make sure that the
current crisis results in the relaunching of the Community. The prerequisites
for th i s are well known:
That the benefits of the European dimension be fully real ized; that the
Communi ty be afforded the necessary resources to ensure its development; that
a lasting solution be worked out for the budget problems; that the Common
Agricultural Pol icy be enabled to perform its function more efficiently; that the
resources avai table be more efficiently managed; that the Community be enlarged
to include Portugal and Spain.
This involves ending the clash of confl icting national interests on too
many unrelated issues and returning to Treaty procedures, the only ones whereby
the higher interest of the Community can once again be made the center of the
debate. In this way the conditions will be established for a solution.
Europe belongs to its citizens. And its citizens demand of thei 
institutions that they enable the Community to bring about economic recovery and
pave the way for them to look forward to a better future.
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The Week In Review
Contents: Prime Minister PapandreouReports to European Parliament on
Greeae s Six-Month Presidenay.of the European Community 
PLO Evaauation from Lebanon in Greek ships Delayed by Israeli
Attaaks 
-- 
CYPf'us: U. N. Peaaekeeping Mandate ReneUJed 
Prime Minister Papandreou Meets European JeUJish Leaders 
Athens.
NR. PAPANDREQU I S REPORr TO EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ANALYZES THE CAUSES
OF ATHENS SUMMIT FAILURE
Reporting to the European Parliam=nt .last Tuesday, as is custanary at the end of each
nernber' s six-nonth presidency of the European Corrmunity, Prine Minister Papandreou
analyzed the reasons for the failure of the recent surrm:i.t meeting in Athens of the
Corrmunity leaders to reach agreerrent on the major problems confronting the Community
as 1984 begins.
These failures concerned:
The Cormon Agricultural Policy
Structural funds
Development of new policies
Currency problems and improved currency di;.scipline
Enlargement of the Community
Increasing the Corrmunity I S CMIl resources
Setting aside the detailed and technical aspects of these complex problems, Mr. Papandreou
argued in his address that the failure to resolve them arose from deeper causes. It was
not the result, he said, of recent developrrents , but of a continuous process over a long
period of time rrarked by a progressive  v.reaken..L'1g  and stagnation of the Community
:functioning  Successive stmrni ts atterrpted, said the Greek Prime Minister, to SurrrDunt
the problems. with declarations of good intentions, with the result that the problems
becane rrore acute as their solution was deferred. 
Self-centered Mati va tions Ham Corrmuni ty Interests
Little was done, Mr. Papandreou continued, to provide the cohesion which the Conmunity
needs, especially following its enlargement in the past and the hoped-for enlargement of
the future. On the contrary, the inequalities within the Comm.mity have been intensified
rather than reduced.
In his view, said Mr. Papandreou, these failures have occurred because each nember of the
CoIrmunity has reached its positions on these issues on the basis of a self-centered concern
/0 . 
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in tenns of its own benefits, with each country tending to "pass the bucl.:" to another
rather than collalxJr~te in decisions for the general benefit of the Cormumi ty as a whole.
A broad choice to bE= nade, if the Corrmunity seeks to define its future, is whether
Europe is to have its awn ITDre powerful identity with respect to the rest of the v;orld,
a nore consistent external trade pJlicy , able to employ means equal to those available
to the v;orld's other major trading powers. Mr. Papandreou reminded his audience, in
this context of his renarks to the Center for European Studies in Brussels on November
24 last, when he conplained of the danaging effects on Europe and the world econo~ in
general of the high interest rates in the U. S .
Mr. PapanClreou claimed that Greece had fulfilled its presidential task responsibly and
skilfully, and nade a plea (echoing the strongly-expressed views of European Com:nission
president Gaston Thorn) that the Corrmunity s permanent officials and com:nittees should
resolve the mass of technical details .in advance of future summit meetings, rather than
-- as hitherto -- overloading the leaders at the summit with those details and limiting
their capacity to deal, as they should exclusively, with broad !;X)licy issues of major
irrpJrtance .
The "Moment of Truth"
Concluding on a note ?f mixed c~ution and optimism, Mr. Papandr~u said: 
" 'l'he utter failure of the summit meeting justifies, if you like, some or our
doubts as to v-lhether the pJlitical vlill exists to go forward towards a
substantive re-structuring of the Community, m:lk:ing its operation acceptable
to all its rrembers. It is in this context t~t we have suggested that the
time may have come fora new Messina-type meeting at which, without
abandoning the spirit of the Treaty of Rome, we can attempt to revise our
pJsitions On the najor problems of our times.
It appears that only under conditions of crisis and total failure we do have
the noti vation for a radical re-examination of the course and future of Europe.
So today' s crisis may contain the seed of a new IrDve in the right direction
for the Comnunity, changing the bad habits' of many years in vroch critical
problems have been tackled at five minutes past midnight instead of at five
minutes before midnight. The French presidency has taken over the baton from
us, somewhere between those two times. All of us hope that, continuing the
efforts of the six rronths vvhich are now coming to an end, that a truly new
departure for Europe can be achieved at this noment .of truth"
GREEK SHIPS READY TO EVACUATE PLO MILITIAMEN FRCN LEBANON: DEIAYED BY ISRAELI ATl'ACKS
Having received from several governrrents consulted their assurances of safe passage,
Greece prepared over the week-end to go ahead with its operation to asssist the evacuation
from Iebanon of some 4 000 nembers of the Palestine Liberation Organization militia
loyal to the PLO chairman Mr. Yasser Arafat.
Five Greek passenger ships engaged in the evacuation sailed from the port of Piraeus and
were expected to take on the PLO militiamen and sail fram the Lebanese pJrt of Tripoli
today or torrorrow. With the ships now waiting in a Cyprus port, the operation is being
held up, however, by Israeli gunboat attacks on the evacuation pJrt of Tripoli. The ships
in question are: Santorini (2,157 tons); ()jysseus Elytis (8,167 tons); Vergina (5, 003
tons);. Naxos (3 985 tons); and Ionian Glory (3,467 tons). The ships, escorted by
French naval vessels, are due to ferry their passengers to destinations in Tunis and North
Yerren .
/. . .